Sandra Babcock v. Butler County by unknown
2015 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
11-24-2015 
Sandra Babcock v. Butler County 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2015 
Recommended Citation 
"Sandra Babcock v. Butler County" (2015). 2015 Decisions. 1225. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2015/1225 
This November is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted 
for inclusion in 2015 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
 PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
________ 
 
No. 14-1467 
_________ 
 
SANDRA J. BABCOCK; JAMES T. KENAAN, Jr.: 
BRADLEY J. SARVEY; DALE R. LIPAN; SHAWN J. 
KELLY; SAMANTHA PISTORIUS;  
ANTHONY BLUMLING; RANDAL K. CYPHER; CHAD 
NEIGH; TORY A. COYLE; JOSEPH HANCHOSKY; 
DARREN M. KNOX; TODD WALKER; MICHAEL 
EMERY; KEVIN POLLACK; RAY SLATER; MICHAEL J. 
SHULER; TRAVIS MACULSKI; LEN THORNLEY;  
JASON PRY; ROBERT D. SEATONL BRUCE W. FAIR; 
LISA VASEY; MICHAEL A. GRAHAM; JOAN MUIR; 
MATTHEW L. EDGAR; CHRISTOPHER A. FORINGER; 
DAVID L. NADING;  JAMES W. WGANER; EVAN R. 
LONG; JUSTIN F. KRILEY; KELLY J. BUNDY; 
RICHARD ZENTZ, Jr.; SHAUN A. SMITH; RANDY S. 
RUSSELL; RYAN REKICH; DAVID C. SUMMERVILLE; 
DESMOND FORINGER; AARON C. SLOBADA; 
KRISTOPHER M. STEIGHNER; MISTY D. HOGAN; 
DAVID K. WINTERS; BEAU SNEDDON; BRANDON 
COUSINS; FRANCIS WALTERS; LISA MARIE 
ZALUDEK; COREY RICHARD HELFRICH; 
LANCE NEIGH; MARLENE STINE; QUINTIN GREY; 
TRAVIS TRIMBUR; WILLIAM HILE, JR.; JOHN 
STOJKA; CHRISTPHER HASKINS; DAWN MAIER; 
MARK BOWAN; MATTHEW WAGNER; MARK 
2 
 
GUTSHALL; PATRICK CARLSON; MICHAEL TEXTER; 
MICHAEL HASYCHAK; MICHAEL DORONDO; DAVID 
CHRISTIE; MARK BISHOP, CHRISTOPHER REEVES; 
MARK GROSSMAN; RYAN MCCANDLESS; 
SPENCER CROUSE; MARK ALLEN BODKIN; REBECCA 
RITZERT; ROGER FEDOKOVITZ; JEFFREY BAILEY; 
SCOTT LEWIS, Individually an on behalf of all those 
similarily situated, 
                                     Appellants  
 
v. 
 
BUTLER COUNTY; JOHN DOES 
________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. No. 2-12-cv-00394) 
District Judge:  Honorable Arthur J. Schwab 
_______ 
 
Argued: May 19, 2015 
Before: FUENTES, GREENAWAY, JR., and SLOVITER, 
Circuit Judges. 
 
(Opinion Filed: November 24, 2015) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3 
 
 
Justin L. Swidler, Esq.    [Argued] 
Swartz Swidler 
1101 Kings Highway North 
Suite 402 
Cherry Hill, NJ  08034 
 Attorney for Appellant 
 
Marie M. Jones, Esq. [Argued] 
Michael R. Lettrich, Esq. 
Jones Passodelis 
707 Grant Street 
Suite 3510, Gulf Tower 
Pittsburgh, PA  15219 
 Attorney for Appellees 
 
________________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
________________ 
 
 
SLOVITER, Circuit Judge. 
This putative class action was initiated by Sandra Babcock, a 
corrections officer at the Butler County Prison in Butler, 
Pennsylvania.  Babcock claims that Butler County failed to 
properly compensate her and those similarly situated for 
overtime in violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act 
(“FLSA”), 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-209, et seq.  The FLSA requires 
an employee who works “a workweek longer than forty 
hours” to be paid at least one and one-half times the 
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employee’s regular rate for the work performed over forty 
hours.  29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1). 
  
This appeal raises the issue of whether a portion of time for 
the Butler County Prison corrections officers’ meal periods is 
compensable under the FLSA.1  There is no provision of the 
FLSA that directly addresses this issue.  Two tests have been 
suggested by other courts of appeal: one looks to whether the 
employee has been relieved from all duties during the 
mealtime; the other, more generally adopted, looks to the 
party to which the “predominant benefit” of the mealtime 
belongs.  The District Court noted that this Circuit has not yet 
established a test to determine whether a meal period is 
compensable under the FLSA.  For the reasons set forth 
below, this Court will adopt the predominant benefit test and 
affirm the District Court. 
I. 
Many of the relevant facts are not disputed.  A collective 
bargaining agreement (“CBA”) between Butler County and 
the employees who work at the Butler County Prison provides 
that corrections officers work eight and one-quarter hour 
shifts that include a one hour meal period, of which forty-five 
minutes are paid and fifteen minutes are unpaid.2  It is the 
                                              
1 There is a special provision in the FLSA that covers 
employees engaged in fire protection or law enforcement 
activities, 29 U.S.C. § 207(k), but none of the parties to this 
case has suggested it has any applicability here. 
2 Plaintiffs produced the CBA in this case and made it part of 
the record.  Accordingly, the CBA was appropriately 
considered on the Rule 12(b)(6) motion below, and is 
appropriately considered on this appeal.  See Pension Ben. 
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lack of compensation for that fifteen minutes that is the 
subject of this action.  During the meal period, the corrections 
officers may not leave the prison without permission from the 
warden or deputy warden, and they must remain in uniform, 
in close proximity to emergency response equipment, and on 
call to respond to emergencies.  Plaintiffs claim that as a 
result of this meal period policy, the officers cannot run 
personal errands, sleep, breathe fresh air, or smoke cigarettes 
during mealtime, and if an emergency or unexpected situation 
arises, the officers must respond immediately in person, in 
uniform, and with appropriate response equipment.  Plaintiffs 
allege that because of these restrictions, they should be 
compensated for the full hour.  
 
Butler County filed a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), arguing that the corrections 
officers’ meal periods were not compensable work because 
the officers received the “predominant benefit” of the meal 
period.3  The District Court agreed and dismissed the 
complaint.  Plaintiffs do not dispute the appropriateness of 
applying the predominant benefit test. Rather, they argue that 
their pleadings establish a plausible claim for relief under 
                                                                                                     
Guar. Corp. v. White Consol. Indus., Inc., 998 F.2d 1192, 
1196 (3d Cir. 1993).   
3 A Rule 12(b)(6) “motion to dismiss may be granted only if, 
accepting the well-pleaded allegations in the complaint as 
true and viewing them in the light most favorable to the 
plaintiff, a court concludes that those allegations ‘could not 
raise a claim of entitlement to relief.’”  Simon v. FIA Card 
Servs., N.A., 732 F.3d 259, 264 (3d Cir. 2013) (quoting Bell 
Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 554, 558 (2007)). 
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either the predominant benefit test or the relieved from all 
duties test. 
II. 
The predominant benefit tests asks “whether the officer is 
primarily engaged in work-related duties during meal 
periods.”4  The majority of the courts of appeals have adopted 
this test.  See, e.g., Reich v. S. New England Telecomm. 
Corp., 121 F.3d 58, 61 (2d Cir. 1997); Roy v. Cty. of 
Lexington, 141 F.3d 533, 544-45 (4th Cir. 1998); Bernard v. 
IBP, Inc. of Neb., 154 F.3d 259, 264-65 (5th Cir. 1998); Hill 
v. United States, 751 F.2d 810, 814 (6th Cir. 1984); 
Alexander v. City of Chicago, 994 F.2d 333, 335 (7th Cir. 
1993); Henson v. Pulaski Cty. Sheriff Dep’t, 6 F.3d 531, 534 
(8th Cir. 1993); Armitage v. City of Emporia, 982 F.2d 430, 
432 (10th Cir. 1992); Avery v. City of Talladega, 24 F.3d 
1337, 1347 (11th Cir. 1994).  Plaintiffs cite only two cases 
that purportedly apply the relieved from all duties test: 
Kohlheim v. Glynn County5 and Busk v. Integrity Staffing 
Solutions, Inc.6  The court in neither case, however, actually 
applied that test.  Instead, the Eleventh Circuit in Kohlheim 
applied its version of the predominant benefit test.  915 F.2d 
at 1477 (“The firefighters are subject to real limitations on 
their freedom during mealtime which inure to the benefit of 
the county; accordingly, the three mealtime periods are 
compensable under FLSA regulations for overtime 
purposes.”).  In Busk, the Ninth Circuit identified the two 
                                              
4 Armitage v. City of Emporia, 982 F.2d 430, 432 (10th Cir. 
1992) (internal quotation and citation omitted). 
5 915 F.2d 1473 (11th Cir. 1990). 
6 713 F.3d 525 (9th Cir. 2013), rev’d, 135 S. Ct. 513 (2014). 
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tests but explained that “[t]he distinction between the 
‘completely relieved from duty’ and ‘predominant benefit’ 
standards d[id] not matter for th[at] case, which turn[ed] on 
whether the activities at issue [we]re compensable ‘work.’”  
713 F.3d at 531 n.4.  The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth 
Circuit’s decision in Busk and focused the analysis on “work” 
as defined by the Portal-to-Portal Act.  135 S. Ct. 513.   In 
any event, the predominant benefit test is uncontroversial in 
the case before us—neither party disputes that it is the 
appropriate standard.  Accordingly, we join our sister Circuits 
in adopting the predominant benefit test.     
   
Courts have generally eschewed a literal reading of a 
Department of Labor regulation that provides that during a 
“bona fide meal period” 
 
[t]he employee must be 
completely relieved from duty for 
the purposes of eating regular 
meals. . . . The employee is not 
relieved if he is required to 
perform any duties, whether 
active or inactive, while eating.  
For example, an office employee 
who is required to eat at his desk 
or a factory worker who is 
required to be at his machine is 
working while eating. 
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29 C.F.R. § 785.19(a).7  Instead, courts have assessed the 
totality of the circumstances to determine, on a case-by-case 
basis, to whom the benefit of the meal period inures.  Most 
courts derive this approach from Supreme Court precedent 
holding that “[w]hether time is spent predominantly for the 
employer’s benefit or for the employee’s is a question 
dependent upon all the circumstances of the case.”  Armour & 
Co. v. Wantock, 323 U.S. 126, 133 (1944), superseded on 
other grounds, Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947, Pub. L. No. 80-
49, 61 Stat. 84, codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 251-262.   
Thus, the predominant benefit test is necessarily a fact-
intensive inquiry.  For some courts, whether the employee is 
free to leave the premises is of particular importance.  Others 
emphasize the number of interruptions to which the 
employees are subject.  As the Eleventh Circuit has stated, 
“the essential consideration in determining whether a meal 
period is a bona fide meal period or a compensable rest period 
is whether the employees are in fact relieved from work for 
the purpose of eating a regularly scheduled meal.”  Kohlheim, 
915 F.2d at 1477.   
Here, although Plaintiffs face a number of restrictions during 
their meal period, the District Court correctly found that, on 
balance, these restrictions did not predominantly benefit the 
                                              
7 In evaluating the effect of these regulations, it is significant 
to keep in mind that the Supreme Court has commented that 
interpretive regulations issued by the Secretary of the 
Department of Labor under the FLSA do not have the force of 
law; the regulations “constitute a body of experience and 
informed judgment to which courts and litigants may properly 
resort for guidance.”   Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 
140 (1944).   
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employer.  In comparison to the cadre of case law addressing 
mealtime compensability in the law enforcement context, the 
allegations in Plaintiffs’ complaint do not suffice.  For 
example, the corrections officers here could request 
authorization to leave the prison for their meal period and 
could eat lunch away from their desks. In Alexander v. City of 
Chicago, in contrast, police officers were required to receive 
permission to take a meal period and were not permitted to 
read “nondepartmental publications.”8     
Another factor to consider is the existence of the CBA.  We 
find helpful the decision of the Seventh Circuit in Leahy v. 
City of Chicago, a case initiated by Chicago police officers 
seeking overtime pay.9  The Seventh Circuit, like in the case 
before us, had before it a CBA between the employees and 
the employer. In that case, the City of Chicago faced an 
action brought by Chicago police officers seeking overtime 
pay.  In affirming the district court, the Seventh Circuit held 
that the CBA sufficiently protected the officers’ right to 
overtime compensation.  In this case, although the CBA is 
silent on the compensability of the fifteen-minute period, it 
provides corrections officers with the benefit of a partially-
compensated mealtime and mandatory overtime pay if the 
mealtime is interrupted by work.  As the Seventh Circuit 
stated, “[t]he FLSA requires no more.”10  The CBA, then, 
assumes “that generally an officer is not working during a 
meal period, but provides for appropriate compensation when 
an officer actually does work during the meal.”11   
                                              
8 994 F.2d at 335.  
9 96 F.3d 228 (7th Cir. 1996). 
10 Id. at 232 (citing Alexander, 994 F.2d at 345 (Bauer, C.J., 
dissenting)). 
11 Id. 
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The Dissent argues that we have “disregard[ed] Supreme 
Court precedent,” inappropriately focused on a “red herring” 
(the CBA), and relied upon a “factually inapposite and legally 
outdated” case in our “misguided approach” to this case. 
Dissenting Op. at 1, 7.  In reality, our approach is consistent 
with the weight of precedent, considers the CBA as one 
relevant—though not dispositive—factor, and merely comes 
to a different conclusion regarding the predominant benefit of 
the corrections officers’ uninterrupted mealtime period under 
the totality of the circumstances.  Although we find the 
Seventh Circuit’s analysis in Leahy useful for comparison, the 
Dissent is correct that the instant case is distinguishable, 
which is why, unlike the Leahy court, we do not hold that 
“the [collective bargaining] agreement is a defense to liability 
under the FLSA.”  Leahy, 96 F.3d at 232 (emphasis added).  
Nor have we “conflate[d] contractual rights with statutory 
ones.”  Manning v. Boston Med. Ctr. Corp., 725 F.3d 34, 52 
n.9 (1st Cir. 2013).  Rather, we consider the agreed-upon 
characterization of the fifteen-minute unpaid meal break as a 
factor in analyzing to whom the predominant benefit of the 
period inures. 
 
We have been advised at argument that the CBA is soon to 
expire.  During the collective bargaining for the new contract, 
the parties will have a fresh opportunity to consider the issue 
of compensation for the fifteen minutes at issue in this case.  
It has been noted by the Supreme Court that employers and 
employees may make “reasonable provisions of contract or 
custom governing the computation of work hours where 
precisely accurate computation is difficult or impossible.”  
Tenn. Coal, Iron & R. Co. v. Muscoda Local No. 123, 321 
U.S. 590, 603 (1944), superseded by statute on other 
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grounds, Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947, Pub. L. No. 80-49, 61 
Stat. 84, codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 251-262. 
 
Although the District Court decided this case on the 
pleadings, there has been, unlike in Alexander, “sufficient 
development of the facts to enable a capable application of 
the appropriate predominant benefit standard, including a 
determination of whether the officers are unable to pass the 
mealtime comfortably because their time or attention is 
devoted primarily to official responsibilities.”  994 F.2d at 
339.  Here, even accepting all of Plaintiffs’ allegations as 
true, we do not find that the officers were “primarily engaged 
in work-related duties” during the daily, agreed-upon fifteen 
minutes of uninterrupted mealtime.  Armitage, 982 F.2d at 
432 (citing Lamon v. City of Shawnee, 972 F.2d 1145, 1157 
(10th Cir. 1992)).  As a result, we find that they receive the 
predominant benefit of the time in question and are not 
entitled to compensation for it under the FLSA.  
 
For the foregoing reasons, we hold that Plaintiffs’ claims 
under the predominant benefit test fail to state a claim upon 
which relief can be granted.  We will accordingly affirm the 
District Court’s order granting Butler County’s motion to 
dismiss.  
GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judge, dissenting.   
 Today the Majority holds that Plaintiffs’ Fair Labor 
Standards Act (“FLSA”) claims should be dismissed based 
upon a flawed application of the predominant benefit test.  
Specifically, the Majority erroneously concentrates on 
whether, under the parties’ collective bargaining agreement 
(“CBA”), Plaintiffs are currently paid for a portion of their 
meal period.  The Majority thereby disregards Supreme Court 
precedent on the definition of work.  Indeed, Plaintiffs’ 
current contractual compensation, upon which the Majority 
focuses, is a red herring that improperly detracts from the 
factual allegations in the Complaint.1 
                                                        
1 As an initial matter, to the extent the Majority relies on CBA 
compensation provisions in its decision to dismiss Plaintiffs’ 
Complaint, the Supreme Court has instructed that (1) the 
FLSA takes precedence over CBAs, and (2) a CBA standing 
alone may not control an FLSA claim.  See Barrentine v. 
Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 450 U.S. 728, 740–41 
(1981) (“[C]ongressionally granted FLSA rights take 
precedence over conflicting provisions in a collectively 
bargained compensation arrangement.”); Skidmore v. Swift & 
Co., 323 U.S. 134, 136–37 (1944) (“Whether [a meal period] 
falls within or without the [FLSA] is a question of fact [that] 
involves scrutiny and construction of the agreements between 
the particular parties, appraisal of their practical construction 
of the working agreement by conduct, consideration of the 
nature of the service, and its relation to the waiting time, and 
all of the surrounding circumstances.”).  The CBA simply 
does not govern statutory rights, nor can it preclude access to 
a federal forum.  Cf. Alexander v. City of Chi., 994 F.2d 333, 
339 n.11 (7th Cir. 1993) (“[W]e are not persuaded by the 
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  Plaintiffs2 are corrections officers at the Butler County 
Correctional Facility who seek compensation for meal periods 
that they argue constitute compensable work under the FLSA.  
Although the Majority acknowledges the fact-intensive and 
circumstance-specific nature of the totality-of-the-
circumstances inquiry under the predominant benefit test, see 
Majority Op. at 6, the Majority does not permit the Plaintiffs 
in this case to conduct the discovery that would permit them 
access to the facts and circumstances to meet that standard. 
 Rather, the Majority misconstrues the predominant 
benefit standard.  Its decision to dismiss relies upon the facts 
that Plaintiffs may request authorization to leave the prison 
for their meal period, are compensated for the first forty-five 
minutes of their hour lunch period, and must be compensated 
                                                                                                                            
defendants’ argument that the collective bargaining 
agreement between the City and its police officers obviates 
the officers’ claim by confirming those parties’ understanding 
that meal periods are not working time within the FLSA.  
Although a factfinder might consider such an agreement as 
one among many factors . . . it certainly does not outright 
preclude the officers’ claim.”).  Furthermore, it is well 
settled—and Defendant concedes—that it is not possible to 
contract around federal law.  See Appellee’s Br. at 17.   
2 Plaintiff Sandra Babcock moved for conditional collective 
action certification of a class of similarly situated corrections 
officers, and over fifty other officers joined the proposed 
class.  However, the District Court dismissed the action 
before reaching the collective certification motion.   
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if their meal period is “interrupted.”3  See CBA, Article V, 
Section 5.1.D.1.  Further, the Majority discusses a Seventh 
Circuit decision, Leahy v. City of Chicago, 96 F.3d 228 (7th 
Cir. 1996), which is inapposite to the instant case, has been 
soundly rejected by the two circuits that have considered it, 
and has been called into question by subsequent Supreme 
Court precedent.4 
 The issue before us is not whether Plaintiffs are paid 
for the first forty-five minutes of their meal period and paid if 
called upon to work during their lunch hour.  Nor is the issue 
before us whether Plaintiffs may request permission to leave 
the prison.5  Instead, it is whether Plaintiffs should be paid 
because they allege that they are required to be prepared to 
                                                        
3 See Majority Op. at 7 (“[T]he corrections officers here could 
request authorization to leave the prison for their meal 
period.”); id. (“[The CBA] provides corrections officers with 
the benefit of a partially-compensated mealtime and 
mandatory overtime pay if the mealtime is interrupted by 
work.”). 
4 See Wright v. Universal Mar. Serv. Corp., 525 U.S. 70, 82 
(1998); Manning v. Bos. Med. Ctr. Corp., 725 F.3d 34, 52 n.9 
(1st Cir. 2013); Bernard v. IBP, Inc. of Neb., 154 F.3d 259, 
264 (5th Cir. 1998). 
5 That Plaintiffs may request permission to leave the prison 
during the lunch period should have no influence on the 
Court’s decision.  There is nothing in the record establishing 
the frequency with which Plaintiffs are allowed to leave the 
prison.  This is precisely the type of fact-gathering that may 
be conducted during discovery. 
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serve at a moment’s notice for the entirety of the meal period.  
As a result of maintaining this readiness to serve Defendant, 
Plaintiffs allege that they are subject to a number of 
restrictions and prohibitions that greatly limit their movement 
and activities.  Considered in their totality, these restrictions 
create conditions constituting compensable work.  As such, 
one can only conclude that the Complaint was improperly 
dismissed; I therefore respectfully dissent. 
I. Plaintiffs Raise a Plausible Claim that 
Uninterrupted Meal Periods Are Compensable Work.  
 In their Complaint, Plaintiffs allege that they must 
remain in uniform, in the prison, in close proximity to 
emergency response equipment, and on call to respond to 
emergencies, for the duration of their meal periods.  App. 24, 
¶ 27. They also allege that they are not permitted to go 
outside, sleep, smoke, or run personal errands during this 
time.  Id. ¶¶ 30, 31, 32. 
 “The central issue in mealtime cases is whether 
employees are required to ‘work’ as that term is understood 
under the FLSA.”  Reich v. S. New England Telecomm. 
Corp., 121 F.3d 58, 64 (2d Cir. 1997) (citing Henson v. 
Pulaski Cty. Sheriff Dep’t, 6 F.3d 531, 533–34 (8th Cir. 
1993)).  “[T]he [Supreme] Court [has] held that ‘work’ under 
the FLSA means ‘physical or mental exertion (whether 
burdensome or not) controlled or required by the employer 
and pursued necessarily and primarily for the benefit of the 
employer and his business.’”  Id.  (quoting Tenn. Coal, Iron 
& R. Co. v. Muscoda Local No. 123, 321 U.S. 590, 598 
(1944)).  Indeed, “the Court counseled that the determination 
of what constitutes work is necessarily fact-bound.”  Id. 
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(citing Armour & Co. v. Wantock, 323 U.S. 126, 133 (1944); 
Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 136–37). 
 When courts evaluate which hours should be 
compensated as work, “the answer depends [in part] upon the 
degree to which the employee is free to engage in personal 
activities during periods of idleness.”  Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 
138 (internal quotation marks omitted).  The Supreme Court 
has further clarified:  
Readiness to serve may be hired, quite as much 
as service itself, and time spent lying in wait for 
threats to the safety of the employer’s property 
may be treated by the parties as a benefit to the 
employer.  Whether time is spent predominantly 
for the employer’s benefit or for the employee’s 
is a question dependent upon all the 
circumstances of the case. 
Armour, 323 U.S. at 133.   
 Where employees have faced significant restrictions 
for the benefit of their employer, meal periods have been 
considered compensable work under the FLSA.   
 During such periods when “workers [were] restricted 
to the site for the purpose of performing valuable security 
service for the company,” the Second Circuit found the meal 
period to be compensable as work.  Reich, 121 F.3d at 65.  
Although observing that “the workers perform different 
services during meal breaks than throughout the rest of the 
day,” the Second Circuit reasoned that “the workers’ on-site 
presence [during meals] is solely for the benefit of the 
employer and, in their absence, the company would have to 
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pay others to perform those same services.”  Id.  The court 
concluded, “[b]y not compensating these workers, [the 
employer] is effectively receiving free labor.”  Id. 
 Similarly, here, Plaintiffs have alleged that they are 
required to remain at the correctional facility during their 
meal period to be available to assist in security measures.  
Indeed, state regulations require certain staffing levels be 
maintained at correctional facilities at all times.6  As in Reich, 
without Plaintiffs’ presence at the facility during meals, 
Defendant could be required to hire others during that time 
period.  Plaintiffs’ allegations regarding the restrictions on 
their movement and activities are sufficient to state a claim 
under the FLSA that the meal period is compensable work. 
 The Majority distinguishes this case from Alexander v. 
City of Chicago—where the Seventh Circuit reversed the 
district court’s entry of judgment on the pleadings—based on 
the fact that, there, “police officers were required to receive 
permission to take a meal period and were not permitted to 
read ‘nondepartmental publications.’”  Majority Op. at 7.  
Although the police officers in Alexander faced additional 
prohibitions relating to their personal behavior, they were 
subject to several of the same restrictions on activity and 
movement that Plaintiffs face here.  There, during meal times 
the police officers:  (1) had to remain within their assigned 
district; (2) had to remain in uniform; (3) could not nap or 
rest; and (4) were required to respond to emergencies and 
                                                        
6 See 37 Pa. Code § 95.241.  The specific standards set for the 
Butler County Correctional Facility are not in the record at 
this time; this is another type of fact-gathering that may be 
conducted during discovery. 
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requests for assistance from the public.  994 F.2d at 334–35.  
Here, Plaintiffs:  (1) had to remain within the prison; (2) had 
to remain in uniform; (3) could not sleep; and (4) were 
required to respond to emergencies.  App. 24, ¶¶ 27–34.  As 
in Alexander, Plaintiffs are required to maintain a physical 
and mental readiness primarily for the benefit of their 
employer.  Therefore, the Majority’s reliance on Alexander to 
compel a different result here is misplaced.7 
                                                        
7  Moreover, at oral argument, Plaintiffs represented that 
corrections officers face restrictions on reading materials—
another similarity to Alexander which weakens the Majority’s 
attempt to distinguish the case.  This is a third example of an 
area in which factual development should have been allowed.  
Nevertheless, the Majority concludes that there has been 
“sufficient factual development of the facts to enable a 
capable application of the appropriate predominant benefit 
standard.”  Majority Op. at 9.  Plaintiffs, however, are entitled 
to a correct application of the predominant benefit standard to 
an appropriately developed record.  Even if the District Court 
had properly determined that the Complaint had been 
insufficiently pled, the dismissal still would have been 
improper.  Rather, because amendment would not have been 
futile, Plaintiffs should have been given leave to amend.  See 
Phillips v. Cty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 228 (3d Cir. 
2008) (“[I]n the event a complaint fails to state a claim, 
unless amendment would be futile, the District Court must 
give a plaintiff the opportunity to amend her complaint.”)  
Indeed, “[i]t does not matter whether or not a plaintiff seeks 
leave to amend.”  Id. at 236. 
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II. The Majority’s Reliance on Leahy Is Factually and 
Legally Flawed. 
 The Majority also relies on Leahy v. City of Chicago to 
support its misguided approach in this case.  See Majority Op. 
at 7.  However, Leahy is both factually inapposite and legally 
outdated.  In Leahy, the Seventh Circuit found that because 
“the collective bargaining agreement’s guarantee of overtime 
compensation for time worked in excess of eight hours in an 
eight-and-one-half hour tour of duty protects Chicago police 
officers’ FLSA rights to overtime compensation[,] . . . the 
agreement is a defense to liability under the FLSA and the 
plaintiffs’ suit cannot succeed.”  96 F.3d at 232.  The instant 
case is factually dissimilar from Leahy because the CBA here 
explicitly precludes the arbitrator from making determinations 
concerning compliance with the FLSA. 8   Indeed, the 
arbitrator’s ambit here was limited to the scope of the CBA, 
and the arbitrator did not reach the question of whether the 
FLSA had been violated.9 
 Further, Leahy’s holding is questionable post-Wright 
because Wright did not address whether the plaintiffs had 
exercised a “clear and unmistakable waiver” of their statutory 
right to a federal forum.  See Wright, 525 U.S. at 81–82.  
Indeed, no court of appeals has followed Leahy in the 
                                                        
8 See Arbitrator’s Decision at 6, 7 (“Simply stated, the CBA 
does not authorize an arbitrator to resolve FLSA claims.”; “I 
have not reviewed or considered the FLSA in rendering an 
Award, and I express no opinion regarding whether or not the 
FLSA has been violated.”). 
9 See id. at 6. 
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nineteen years since it was issued.  Two of our sister circuits 
have addressed Leahy, and each has squarely rejected its 
holding.  The Fifth Circuit dismissed Leahy, noting,“[n]ot 
only is the majority position ‘preposterous,’ it completely 
ignores the Supreme Court’s decision in Barrentine” because, 
“[u]nder Barrentine, [] the plaintiffs’ right to pursue a suit 
under the FLSA is completely independent from their rights 
under the CBA.”  Bernard, 154 F.3d at 263–64 (footnotes 
omitted) (quoting Leahy, 96 F.3d at 235) (Cudahy, J., 
dissenting).  The First Circuit also rejected the Leahy 
analysis, observing that it “conflates contractual rights with 
statutory ones.”  Manning, 725 F.3d at 52 n.9.  Given the 
paucity of support for Leahy and the likelihood that its 
holding did not survive Wright, the Majority’s reliance on 
Leahy to dismiss Plaintiffs’ claims is mistaken. 
III. Conclusion 
 In their Complaint, Plaintiffs set forth sufficient 
allegations to state a claim that their meal period should be 
considered compensable work under the FLSA.  For this 
reason alone, their claims should not have been dismissed.  
Further, while discounting Plaintiffs’ factual allegations, the 
Majority decides this matter by overvaluing the CBA’s 
compensation provisions—disregarding relevant Supreme 
Court precedent in the process.  Ending this lawsuit now is 
clearly improper.  I respectfully dissent.  
